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Abstract 
 
Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later 
works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has 
been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically 
obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what 
Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer 
no response to the inductive skeptic. For entirely different reasons, the signifi-
cance of Bertrand Russell’s classic attempt to solve Hume’s problem is also both 
obscure and controversial. Russell accepted that Hume’s reasoning about induc-
tion was basically correct, but he argued that given the centrality of induction in 
our cognitive endeavors something must be wrong with Hume’s basic assump-
tions. What Russell effectively identified as Hume’s (and Reichenbach’s) failure 
was the commitment to a purely extensional empiricism. So, Russell’s solution to 
the problem of induction was to concede extensional empiricism and to accept 
that induction is grounded by accepting both a robust essentialism and a form of 
rationalism that allowed for a priori knowledge of universals. In this paper the 
significance of Reichenbach’s solution to the problem of induction will be made 
clearer via the comparison of these two historically important views about the 
problem of induction. The modest but important contention that will be made 
here is that the comparison of Reichenbach’s and Russell’s solutions calls atten-
tion to the opposition between extensional and intensional metaphysical presup-
positions in the context of attempts to solve the problem of induction. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the problem of induction through the lens of Reichen-
bach’s and Russell’s attempts to resolve Hume’s infamous problem in terms of 
their particular metaphysical commitments. This is potentially of great historical 
interest in and of it itself because they had a brief but relatively unknown ex-
change on the matter. But, it is also of contemporary interest, especially in virtue 
of the importance that metaphysical assumptions play in both attempts to 
ground induction and given the recent resurgence of metaphysics as a meaning-
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ful part of philosophy. Reichenbach’s 1949 letter to Russell, in particular, makes 
it clear that the difference between these two attempts at solving the problem of 
induction is deeply rooted in their differing metaphysical commitments. In that 
letter Reichenbach addresses Russell’s criticism of the pragmatic vindication of 
induction from Russell’s 1948 book and this provided a useful opportunity for 
Reichenbach to both clarify his own views on induction and its metaphysical 
grounds and to show what the pragmatic vindication really amounts to. Here 
Reichenbach’s and Russell’s stances on the problem of induction and its general 
metaphysical grounds will be examined in some detail and an important and 
contemporarily relevant point about the interplay between metaphysical presup-
positions and methodological resources will be made in light of the lessons 
learned from comparing their views. 
 
2. Reichenbach and Russell on Induction: Setting the Stage 
Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction (presented 
and developed in his 1938, 1949a, 1932/1949b and 1949c) is of great interest 
both historically and methodologically. However, various influential commenta-
tors have dismissed it as a pseudo-solution, relegated it to the scrap heap of bad 
philosophical theories or simply regarded it as problematically obscure.1 So, it is 
not wrong to assert that Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction has 
few contemporary followers, that it is not well-regarded and that it is not even 
clearly understood. This last point is, in large part, due to the difficulty in under-
standing exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, espe-
cially as it appears to offer no epistemic response to the inductive skeptic. As 
Laurence Bonjour claims, 
 
the significance of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification remains obscure. As he 
himself insists, that justification still yields no reason at all for thinking that in-
ductive conclusions, or any of the myriad further beliefs which are epistemically 
dependent on them, are to any degree likely to be true. The sort of justification in 
question is thus not epistemic justification, as that concept was construed above; 
to show that beliefs are justified in this alternative way does not answer, or even 
purport to answer, the basic skeptical worry about induction, and is indeed quite 
compatible with the deepest degree of skepticism. It is thus hard to see why it 
should be regarded as any sort of solution to the classical problem of induction 
(BonJour 1986: 99). 
 
The more general dismissal of Reichenbach’s views on induction and the nega-
tive assessment of his pragmatic vindication surely depends in some part on his 
adherence to the controversial frequency interpretation of the concept of proba-
bility.2 This contention is especially poignant and likely to be part of the prob-
lem in virtue of the wide-spread popularity of subjectivism about probability that 
has dominated probability theory since Reichenbach introduced his views on 
the matter. So, this aspect of Reichenbach’s views on induction and probability 
explains in part the charge of obscurity levelled against his pragmatic vindica-
 
1 See, e.g., Skyrms 1966, Salmon 1966, BonJour 1986, BonJour 1992, BonJour 1998, 
Rosenkrantz 1981 and Kelly 1991. 
2 Hájek 1997 and 2009. 
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tion, but the issue of the interpretation of the concept of probability will not be 
the main focus here as it has been treated at length in a variety of other places.3  
More importantly then, there is another prominent but much underempha-
sized aspect of Reichenbach’s views that demands more attention and which 
helps both to more fully explain the significance of Reichenbach’s views on in-
duction and to dispel much of its alleged obscurity. This is his thorough com-
mitment to an extensional metaphysics that compliments his empiricism. The 
contention made here is then that his commitment to a purely extensional met-
aphysics plays a deeply important role in this matter and that the failure to pay 
more careful attention to the role that extensionalism plays in his account of in-
duction in part explains the negative reactions to Reichenbach’s solution. That 
this aspect of Reichenbach’s work has not been sufficiently emphasized is likely 
a consequence of the well-known anti-metaphysical stance of the Berlin Group 
and many of their contemporaries.4 It is likely that their avowed doctrinal rejec-
tion of metaphysics obscured the significance of the underlying metaphysical 
commitments crucially involved in Reichabach’s views on induction and which 
forced him to adopt a radical and purely pragmatic approach to the justification 
of induction.  
For rather different reasons, the significance of Bertrand Russell’s (1912 
and 1948) classic attempts to solve Hume’s problem is also both obscure and 
controversial. Russell accepted that Hume’s reasoning about induction was ba-
sically correct, but he argued that given the centrality of induction in our cogni-
tive endeavors something must be wrong with Hume’s basic assumptions. What 
Russell effectively identified as Hume’s (and ultimately Reichenbach’s) failure 
was the commitment to a purely extensional empiricism. So, Russell’s solution 
to the problem of induction was to concede extensional empiricism and to ac-
cept that induction is grounded by accepting both a robust essentialism and a 
form of rationalism that allowed for a priori knowledge of universals. Ultimately, 
this was supposed to be captured by a set of a priori knowable principles that 
would make inductive inference rational and would permit us to answer the in-
ductive skeptic in an epistemic manner. Of course, this is especially ironic as 
Russell himself championed an extremely austere form of metaphysical con-
servatism in his own work at times.5 
To be sure, neither of those views of induction is without its critics. On the 
one hand, as we have already seen, Reichenbach’s solution importantly faces 
the charges of obscurity and of offering no epistemic response to the inductive 
skeptic. On the other hand, Russell’s solution looks to be objectionably ad hoc 
absent some non-controversial and independent arguments to the effect that the 
universals that are necessary to ground the uniformity of nature actually exist 
and that they are epistemically accessible. This particular charge is especially 
likely to arise from those, like Reichenbach, who incline towards purely exten-
sional forms of empiricism. In any case, here the significance of Reichenbach’s 
and Russell’s solutions to the problem of induction will be made more clear via 
the comparison of these two historically important views about the problem of 
 
3 See, e.g., Skyrms 1966, Salmon 1966, Galavotti 2011 and Teng and Kyburg 2001. 
4 See Carnap 1931, Ayer 1936, Friedman 1999 and Creath 2017 on the anti-metaphysical 
commitments of the logical empiricists/positivists and Reichenbach 1936 and Rescher 
2006 on the Berlin Group and its related views. 
5 See Russell 1918. 
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induction. The modest but important contention that will be made here is that 
the comparison of Reichenbach’s and Russell’s solutions calls attention to the 
opposition between extensional and intensional metaphysical presuppositions in 
the context of their particular attempts to solve the problem of induction.6 It will 
be show that, in effect, what Reichenbach does is to establish an important epis-
temic limitation of extensional empiricism. So, it will be argued here that there 
really is nothing especially obscure about Reichenbach’s thoughts on induction 
at all and his views are not just an anachronism. He was simply working out the 
limits of extensional empiricism with respect to inductive inference. In fact, 
Reichenbach conveys this very point to Russell in his 1949 letter addressing 
Russell’s criticisms of his approach to the problem of induction.7  
More broadly, the point that can be drawn from looking at this bit of histo-
ry is that methodological and epistemological debates like this one about the 
probity of induction cannot easily be disentangled from the associated meta-
physical issues. In the narrow context of this particular debate what we can 
learn from the Russell/Reichenbach exchange is that the sort of justification that 
can be given for induction depends deeply on the austerity of one’s metaphysics. 
In essence, in this debate it appears to be the case that the demand for ontologi-
cal austerity comes with a price; viz. the need to entertain non-epistemic forms 
of justification. In the larger and more recent context of the debate about the jus-
tification of induction what has recently transpired is an increasingly wide-
spread recognition that offering a substantial, successful and non-pragmatic jus-
tification of induction requires conceding both extensional and intensional met-
aphysics in favor of even more inflationary hyper-intensional metaphysics.8 
 
6 The fact that this particular aspect of these two very important twentieth century treat-
ments of induction has not received more attention is curious, particularly as the distinction 
between intensionality and extensionality and the philosophical issues surround this distinc-
tion was the central feature of Carnap’s (1947) magnum opus (which Reichenbach surely 
read) and it was an absolutely fundamental aspect of logical positivism, logical empiricism 
and related movements such as Reichenbach’s Berlin Group. The distinction between in-
tensional and extensional logics is of crucial historical importance in understanding all of 
these views and it is just as important for understanding Reichenbach’s and Russell’s views 
on induction as are the more familiar cluster of issues concerning empiricism, verification, 
etc. But, the intensionality/extensionality distinction has neither received the same degree 
of general attention¾as Friedman (1999) and Creath (2107) amply demonstrate, largely via 
omission¾nor, as the considerations presented here show, has it received adequate atten-
tion in the specific context of Russell’s and Reichenbach’s important debate about induc-
tion.  
7 This approach stands in sharp contrast to his early work which resembles Russell’s ap-
proach in holding that the principle that grounds induction is synthetic a priori. See 
Eberhardt 2011 for discussion of Reichenbach’s early views. He explicitly rejects this 
view in his later work and tells Russell in a 1949 letter that “Induction does not require 
an intensional logic” (Reichenbach 1949d: 410). In other words it does not require the as-
sumption of robust laws of nature. 
8 See, for example, Kelly 2014, Spohn 2005 and Ortner and Leitgeb 2009. Following, 
Nolan (2014: 151) the distinction between extensionality, intensionality and hyper-
intensionality can be made linguistically as follows. A linguistic position is extensional if 
other expressions with the same extension can be substituted into that position salva veri-
tate. Importantly here, the extension of a predicate is the set of objects to which it correct-
ly applies. A linguistic position is (merely) intensional just in case it is not extensional 
and expressions that are necessarily equivalent can be substituted in that position salva 
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This, in turn, reflects a more general movement in the broader discipline of met-
aphysics towards inflationary views involving hyper-intensionality.9 In effect, all 
of this suggests that there are sometimes severe methodological and epistemo-
logical costs associated with austere extensionalist metaphysical views and this 
recognition has seemingly helped to fuel a renaissance in inflationary metaphys-
ics that is surely¾at least in part¾ motivated by the radical methodological 
costs often associated with the sort of metaphysical conservatism adopted by 
Reichenbach, Quine and others.10 
 
3. Reichenbach’s Pragmatic Vindication 
Let us begin by recalling that Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction 
is based on the following (reconstructed) line of argumentation (i.e. the basic 
Reichenbach argument): 
P1: Either nature is uniform or it is not. 
P2: If nature is uniform, then scientific induction will be successful. 
P3: If nature is not uniform, then no method will be successful. 
\   If any method of induction will be successful, then scientific induction 
will be successful.11 
But, according to Reichenbach and echoing Hume, we cannot know whether 
nature is uniform or not because it is neither a matter that can be settled a priori 
nor is it a matter that we can non-circularly establish a posteriori if all we are per-
ceptually acquainted with are particulars. So, as Reichenbach sees it, although 
we know that if any method is successful, then scientific induction will be suc-
cessful, we cannot know that any method really is successful. The gist of his at-
tempt to justify inductive practice then comes from the idea that while we do 
not know that any method will actually be successful we also do not know that 
no method will be successful. Given this result and the fact that scientific induc-
tion can be shown to be an optimal method (in this important sense of “optimal-
ity”) we ought to accept induction as being justified, at least pragmatically 
speaking. As we shall see, what is at the heart of this view is Reichenbach’s 
metaphysical commitment to a form of extensional empiricism that tolerates on-
ly the existence of and knowledge of particulars. 
In any case, as Salmon correctly pointed out in his 1966, the Reichenbach 
argument depends on a false dichotomy. The uniformity of nature is, of course, 
not an all or nothing matter. We can, of course imagine possible worlds that 
contain only individuals with degrees of uniformity that vary radically. So, the 
uniformity of nature seems to be a matter of degree, and it is at least plausible to 
 
veritate. Importantly here, the intension of an extensional set of objects is the defining 
property they share in common. Finally, a linguistic position is hyper-intensional just in 
case it is neither extensional not merely intensional. So, in hyper-intensional contexts 
even necessary equivalents cannot be substituted salva veritate.  
9 See, for example, Cresswell 1975 and Nolan 2014. 
10 See, for example, Quine 1948. 
11 This presentation of a simplified version of Reichenbach’s main argument is taken 
from Skyrms 1966. It is important to note at this juncture that the various criticisms of 
Reichenbach’s views, other than Russell’s, will (for the most part) be ignored here. To 
address all of those criticisms would require too much space, and the point of this paper 
is more historical in any case.  
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believe that a measure of the uniformity of extensional worlds might be. If this 
turns out to be viable, given the space of possible worlds U, we could define a 
measure m(x) on U such that m(x) maps the elements of U into the continuous 
open interval [0,1] representing the uniformity of that extensional world. This 
suggests that Reichenbach’s attempt to justify induction needs to be retooled in 
order to accommodate a concept of world-uniformity that admits of continuous 
degrees. When this is done we can usefully reformulate the basic Reichenbach 
argument as follows. Consider our world wa (the actual world), where wa Î U, 
with a fixed, but, unknown measure of uniformity, the set of all inductive methods 
¡,12 where yi Î ¡ and such that each inductive method has a probability of arriving 
at a true conclusion in its domain of application,13 a function f (m(wn), yn) that 
maps worlds with degrees of world-uniformity and inductive methods into the 
space of probabilities,14 and a constant l that represents the chance probability 
of an inductive method succeeding at a world.15 If we understand e as the degree 
of world-uniformity required for any inductive rule to be reliable with a reliabil-
ity greater than chance,16 i.e. greater than l, then the more sophisticated Reichen-
bach argument can be stated as follows:  
P1′: If the probability that m(wa) = 1 is 1, then scientific induction will be 
successful. 
P2′: If it is probable that 1 > m(wa) > e with probability less than 1 but great-
er than l, then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, 
where p > l < 1. 
P3′: If it is probable that e > m(wa) > 0 with probability greater than 0 but 
less than l, then scientific induction will be successful with probability 
p, where p < l < 0. 
P4′: If the probability that m(wa) = 0 is 1, then no inductive method will be 
successful. 
\ If any inductive method will be successful, scientific induction will be 
successful. 
 
12 Inductive methods are, simply, rules for accepting conclusions concerning unobserved 
cases based on observed cases.  
13 The concept of the domain of application of an inductive method will be discussed at 
some length in what follows. 
14 The function f (m(wn), yn) seems, intuitively, to be a natural sort of function, as degrees 
of world-uniformity seem to be closely related to the probability with which a method 
produces true conclusions. What f (m(wn), yn) is supposed to yield is a probabilistic meas-
ure of the general reliability of a given method at a world with a given measure of uni-
formity, and, as we shall see subsequently, what this function really represents is the set 
of worlds where an inductive method with a well-defined probability of arriving at the 
correct value of a stable frequency will actually produce the correct values.  
15 In other words, l represents the threshold at which methods are no better at producing 
true conclusions than randomly selecting conclusions from the set of all statements of a 
given language £, and, as we shall see, a method that performs at with a success rate no 
better than chance is no method at all. However, the general successfulness of an induc-
tive method will turn out to be a more complex matter involving two aspects. The first 
concerns the reliability of the procedure in its domain, and the second concerns whether 
there exist elements of that domain at a world. 
16 Scientific induction is Reichenbach’s inductive rule, and this rule will be presented 
formally in what follows. 
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It should be noted that Reichenbach’s conclusion still holds in this case and we 
will consider the significance of this conclusion in what follows. However, be-
fore we proceed to do so, it will be instructive to reconstruct Reichenbach’s and 
Russell’s treatments of induction in much greater detail order to see just what 
they amount to and what they imply about inductive inference. 
 
4. Reichenbach’s Conception of Scientific Induction 
The primary motivation that drove Reichenbach to propose his pragmatic justi-
fication of induction concerns a central feature of the frequency interpretation of 
the probability calculus. Familiarity with the details of the probability calculus 
will be assumed here, and with the fact that it is compatible with at least several 
interpretations. The axioms of the probability calculus are, of course, as follows: 
(A.1) P(a) ≥ 0 for all a in the domain of P(•). 
(A.2) P(t) = 1 if t is a tautology. 
(A.3)  P(a Ú b) = P(a) + P(b) if a and b and a Ú b are all in the domain of P(•), 
and a and b are mutually exclusive. 
Recall that on Reichenbach’s frequency interpretation of probabilities such 
quantities are to be construed as tautological consequences of the probability 
calculus.17 More importantly, probabilities are to be regarded as measures of the 
limit of the relative frequency with which one contingent property is associated 
with another in an infinite sequence. More formally, the relative frequency of a 
pair of properties in a sequence is to be defined as follows: 
F n(A, B) = N n(A, B)/N n(A) 
Here F n(A, B) is the frequency of associated As and Bs in a sequence of length 
n. Given this conception of relative frequency we can then define the concept of 
probability as follows: 
P(A, B) = lim F n(A, B)18 
                 n ® ¥  
Having introduced this notion of probability Reichenbach then proposes the rule 
of induction that states: 
 
If an initial section of n elements of a sequence xi is given, resulting in the fre-
quency f n, and if, furthermore, nothing is known about the probability of the 
second level for the occurrence of a certain limit p, we posit that the frequency f i 
(i > n) will approach a limit p within f n ± d when the sequence is continued 
(Reichenbach 1949c: 47). 
 
However, these definitions give rise to some very difficult but well-known prob-
lems concerning the existence of infinite sequences and the existence of such 
convergent limits.19 We, as a matter of fact, are only ever aware of sequences 
that, as Reichenbach claims, “are not intensionally given, but are presented to us 
only by enumeration of their elements, i.e. are extensionally given” (Reichenbach 
1949a: 309), and it seems that any such sequence of observed associations will 
 
17 See Reichenbach 1949b and Weatherford 1982, chapter 4. 
18 See 1949c for details concerning how this derivation is carried out. 
19 Sequences with convergent limiting frequencies are just those sequences that settle into 
stable frequencies in the limit. 
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be finite. Upon considering further extensional enumeration of the elements of a 
given observed sequence we find that such extended sequences are, in point of 
fact, compatible with any value of the limit frequency. If this is so, we might ask 
why we are entitled in any way to assume that the frequency of such an associa-
tion in even very long sequences of observed associations in a population will 
justify our assertion that that frequency will not diverge in further extensive 
enumerations of that sequence.  
Reichenbach tied the frequency interpretation of the concept of probability 
into the problem of induction in virtue of the following central claim: 
 
The aim of induction is to find series of events whose frequency of occurrence 
converges toward a limit (Reichenbach 1938: 350). 
 
Of course, Reichenbach saw that this was just the classical problem of induction 
in a somewhat new guise, and he ultimately showed two things. First, he 
showed that, by definition, if such a limit exists, then the procedure of scientific 
induction will be successful, and, second, that scientific induction is at least as 
good as any other method in discovering what is really the case concerning the 
frequency of an association in a sequence. Reichenbach explains, 
 
Let us assume for the moment that there is a limit towards which the sequence 
converges, then there must be an n from which on our posit [the rule of induc-
tion] leads to the correct result; this follows from the definition of the limit, 
which requires that there be an n from which on the frequency remains within a 
given interval d. If we were to adopt, on the contrary, the principle of always 
positing a limit outside f n ± d when a frequency f n has been observed, such a 
procedure would certainly lead us to a false result from a certain n on. This does 
not mean that there could not be other principles which like the first [the rule of 
induction] would lead to the correct limit. But we can make the following state-
ment about these principles: even if they determine the posit outside f n ± d for a 
smaller n, they must, from a certain n on, determine the posit within f n ± d. All 
other principles of positing must converge asymptotically with the first [the rule 
of induction] (Reichenbach 1949b: 316). 
 
What he showed was that if a limit exists for a sequence, then by repeated appli-
cation the rule of induction will lead to the value of that limit to any desired de-
gree of approximation in a finite number of applications and that all other 
methods will asymptotically converge with the results of the rule of induction. 
So, in spite of the fact that we cannot know that the limiting frequencies of se-
quences exist, we might as well simply accept the rule of induction because it is 
the best method of all methods. In virtue of this Reichenbach’s inductive rule 
might be leveraged into a bulwark against inductive skepticism if it can be 
shown justified in some sense. All methods are, in a sense, parasitic on the rule 
of induction. Again, this pragmatic answer to the problem of induction arose di-
rectly out of Reichenbach’s recognition that, in point of fact, we cannot know that 
such limits exist in our world. We cannot know whether such convergent limits ex-
ist based on the empirical observation of associations in finite, extensionally giv-
en, sequences. So, we are stuck in the situation that either no method at all 
works or induction is the best of all methods. Reichenbach explicitly acknowl-
edges this and explains that 
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Now it is obvious that we have no guaranty that this aim is at all attainable. The 
world may be so disorderly that it is impossible for us to construct series with a 
limit. Let us introduce the term "predictable" for a world which is sufficiently or-
dered to enable us to construct series with a limit. We must admit, then, that we 
do not know whether the world is predictable. But, if the world is predictable, let 
us ask what the logical function of the principle of induction will be (Reichen-
bach 1938: 350-51). 
 
In terms of the sophisticated Reichenbach argument this can be expressed as fol-
lows. If worlds are extensional then, we cannot know the real value of m(wa). 
Nevertheless, it will be true that if 1 ³ m(wa) > e, then scientific induction will be 
successful. If this is not the case, then no method will be successful and the pos-
sibility of doing science is a wash. So, as Reichenbach sees it, we are faced with 
a puzzle and he sees the way out as follows: 
 
If we cannot realize the sufficient conditions of success, we shall at least realize 
the necessary conditions. lf we were able to show that the inductive inference is a 
necessary condition of success, it would be justified; such a proof would satisfy 
any demands which may be raised about the justification of induction (Reichen-
bach 1938: 349). 
 
Building on this he then tells us of the principle of induction and its frequency 
interpretation that, 
 
This procedure must at sometime lead to the true value p, if there is a limit at all; 
the applicability of this procedure, as a whole, is a necessary condition of the ex-
istence of a limit at p (Reichenbach 1938: 351). 
 
But, this does not yet indicate what sort of further justification can be given for 
the inductive principle and Reichenbach is clear that all of this noted thus far is 
compatible with a thoroughgoing skepticism about inductive inference. So, what 
about the matter of justifying the sufficient condition of inductive success (i.e. 
the existence of the limits of relative frequencies)? 
Reichenbach tells us that we can treat the existence of such limits of relative 
frequencies as posits, where posits are not to be treated as beliefs in the normal 
sense, but rather as a kind of wager concerning what would be most advanta-
geous to us. It is then here that we find the introduction of the idea of the justifi-
cation of induction as pragmatic vindication. Reichenbach explains that, 
 
It is evidently the concept of posit which we have to employ for an explanation 
of this method. If in the finite section given we have observed a certain frequency 
f n, we posit that sequence, on further continuation, will converge towards the 
limit f n (more precisely: within the interval f n ± δ). We posit this; we do not say 
that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on 
the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to 
us the most favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this 
individual action (Reichenbach 1949b: 315). 
 
Furthermore, as all other rules are parasitic on the rule of induction it is only 
natural to lay our wager on that rule. We are wagering that 1 ³ m(wa) > e. So, 
the sort of justification his argument provides is clearly a matter of pragmatics. 
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But, in any case, the kind of wager involved in positing the existence of conver-
gent limits in infinite sequences is not the typical kind of wager that a gambler 
makes. Normally, a gambler at least knows the odds with which he is confront-
ed and so can make an informed decision about what outcome to bet on (i.e. 
which is the best bet) but in the case of the limits of infinite sequences we are 
making the posit that the limit converges to f n blindly; i.e. we are making this 
posit when do not know the odds and so we do not know if it is the best posit.  
Reichenbach claims that in such cases we are making what he calls an ap-
proximative posit concerning the existence of such limits. We are blindly wagering 
that 1 ³ m(wa) > e. As we have seen, Reichenbach shows that if we are right about 
the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is correct) then, induction will be suc-
cessful and if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be suc-
cessful. If we are wrong about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is not cor-
rect), then if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be suc-
cessful in this more restricted sense. Therefore, scientific induction is at least op-
timal in this specific sense. However, as Bonjour notes in the passage quoted in 
section 2, this by no means shows that induction is justified in the traditional 
sense, and Reichenbach’s view is apparently compatible with radical skepticism 
concerning the probity of induction. It may simply be false that 1 ³ m(wa) > e and 
given extensional empiricism we cannot know whether this claim is true or false. 
So, as far as we know, the method of induction might well be the best of a bad 
lot. Nonetheless, Reichenbach argues that there is a sense in which his argument 
vindicates induction. It does show that if any method works, then induction 
works. We do not know that it is unreliable, but we know that it is the best 
method if any method is reliable. Importantly, we do not know that the claim 
that there are such limit frequencies is false. Reichenbach explains that, 
 
to renounce the assumption of induction would be necessary only if we knew 
that the assumption is false. But that is not the case¾we do not know if it is true or 
false. And that is quite another matter! Without believing that the assumption is 
true or false we are still justified in defending it in the same way we make a wa-
ger. We want to foresee the future, and we can do it if the assumption of induc-
tion is justified¾and so we wager on this assumption. If it is false, then our ef-
forts are in vain; but if we use the principle of induction we have at least a chance 
of success (Reichenbach 1936: 157). 
 
So why not commit ourselves to the use of scientific induction? Of course, this 
will not likely be a satisfactory justification for someone who has sympathies 
with BonJour’s inductive skeptic, but it is clearly to our practical advantage if 
scientific induction turns out to be reliable. More importantly for the purposes of 
this discussion, what this result really establishes is that given extensional empir-
icism induction can only be pragmatically justified in the sense of Reichenbach’s 
vindication.20 
 
 
 
 
 
20 See Shaffer 2017a for a fully formal reconstructions of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindi-
cation of induction based on both the maximin principle and the dominance principle. 
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5. Russell’s Justification of Induction 
Unlike Reichenbach, Russell ultimately found that consideration of the problem 
of induction demanded that we give up the commitment to a purely extensional 
empiricism in favor of an intension friendly quasi-empiricism. In his The Prob-
lems of Philosophy Russell explains that the principle of induction has two parts as 
follows: 
 
(a) When a thing of a certain sort A has been found to be associated with a 
thing of a certain other sort B, and has never been found to be dissociated from a 
thing of the sort B, the greater the number of cases in which A and B have been 
associated, the greater is the probability that they will be associated in a fresh 
case in which one of them is known to be present. 
(b) Under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of cases of association 
will make the probability of a fresh association a nearly certainty, and will make 
it approach certainty without limit (Russell 1912: 66). 
 
He then notes that the assignment of these sorts of probabilities is always rela-
tive to evidence, relevantly here these assignments are relative to the known cas-
es of A and B being associated. But, there may always be other data which we 
are not in possession of that would force us to accept that we have wrongly es-
timated the probabilities in question. So, he concludes that evidence cannot dis-
prove the principle of induction because the failure of an A’s being associated 
with a B, when they have been associated in the past, cannot refute the claim 
that they are probably associated. More crucially, Russell also specifically tells 
us that, 
 
the principle of induction, while necessary to the validity of all arguments based 
on experience, is itself not capable of being proved by experience, and yet is un-
hesitatingly believed by everyone, at least in all its concrete applications (Russell 
1912: 70). 
 
So, the principle of induction can neither be proved nor disproved by experience. 
But, what is then crucial in Russell's thinking is his claim that, 
 
all knowledge which, on the basis of experience tells us something about what is 
not experienced, is based upon a belief which experience can neither confirm nor 
confute, yet which, at least in its more concrete applications, appears to be a 
firmly rooted in us as many of the facts of experience (Russell 1912: 69). 
 
Russell then proceeds to argue that if the principle of induction is justified at all, 
then it must be justified a priori. The only other possibility, which Russell briefly 
notes in both The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 1912: 60-90) and in Our 
Knowledge of the External World (Russell 1914: 44), is that such a principle is ana-
lytic and so is to be accepted or rejected as a matter of convention. However, 
then, of course, it would not be epistemically justified at all, and so our induc-
tive practices would also fail to be justified. So ultimately in his 1912 Russell 
famously sets out to explain how we can have a priori knowledge of the principle 
of induction, the principle of the uniformity of nature that would ground our 
knowing that m(wa) = 1. In doing so he explicitly concedes extensional empiri-
cism and (in terms of the sophisticated Reichenbach argument) he argues that 
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we can know a priori that the probability m(wa) = 1 because we can know a pri-
ori that universals sufficient to ground inductive practice exist. 
Russell’s desire to offer a solution to Hume’s problem then became an exer-
cise in explaining our knowledge of universals and this is because Russell saw 
that the ever-changing order of particular experiences would have to exhibit real 
and general structure if induction was to be justified.21 Russell begins by explain-
ing that, 
 
all our a priori knowledge is concerned with entities which do not, properly 
speaking exist, either in the mental or on the physical world. These entities are 
such as can be named by parts of speech which are not substantives; they are 
such entities as qualities and relations (Russell 1912: 90). 
 
Moreover, these sorts of things are ultimately identified as universals and real 
objects instantiate such relations. But since universals have a form of being very 
different from ordinary physical objects (or sense-data), knowledge of them must 
be acquired in a very different manner than that by which we come to know par-
ticulars. According to Russell, knowledge of many universals (e.g. redness) is 
acquired through perception, and in doing so he argues that there is more in the 
content of our experiences than just information about concrete particulars.22 
But, in many cases, knowledge of the relations between universals is not purely 
empirical in nature. Unlike our knowledge of universals such as redness, white-
ness, etc., that involves fairly straightforward abstracting from our acquaintance 
with a number of particulars that share some universal in common, our 
knowledge of relations—specifically of the principle of induction—is of a rather 
different nature, primarily because it is much more abstracted and distant from 
our acquaintance with particulars. In fact, Russell (1912: 103) tells us that, “all a 
priori knowledge deals exclusively with relations of universals”. Russell explains that in 
the case of these sorts of logical principles we then can only have immediate or 
intuitive knowledge of such truths and that what is known in this manner is self-
evident even though what is known this way “exists” only in some fairly robust 
Platonic sense outside of the physical world. He is nevertheless clear that self-
evidence is a matter of degree and that the principle of induction is not as self-
evident as some other logical principles (Russell 1912: 117), but it is known a 
priori in this direct manner. More importantly, it is a relation that is a universal 
and it alone grounds inductive practice. If there is no such relation and there is 
no such structure to the world, then no inductive inferences are justified and this 
required Russell to concede the austere metaphysical atomism and empiricism 
that he subscribed to in his 1918. But, Russell did not have much more to say 
about the issue of induction and its grounds or about resolving the incongruity 
of his views about this issue in his 1912 and 1918 works until considerably later 
in 1948. This is simply because during this extended period his attention was di-
rected to other issues having more to do with social and political philosophy. 
The more robust and sophisticated approach to the problem of induction 
that was suggested by Russell in his 1912 is developed and more fully and ex-
tended in his 1948 book Human Knowledge. It is here then that he fully frees him-
 
21 Russell defended the existence of universals on a different basis in his earlier 1911 and 
later in his 1948.  
22 See Russell 1936: 140 and 148-49. 
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self from the chains of his 1918 extensionalism and empiricism and articulates 
how this allows for the justification of induction. Moreover, in this work he 
makes his objections to Reichenbach’s view clear. Russell sums up his devel-
oped view in the following passage: 
 
Assuming it admitted that if an inductive inference is to be valid, there must be 
some relation between a and b, or some characteristic of one of them, in virtue 
of which it is valid, it is clear that this relation must be between intensions¾e.g. 
between “human” and “mortal”, or between “ruminant” and “dividing the 
hoof”. We seek to infer an extensional relation, but we do not know the exten-
sions of a and b when we are dealing with empirically given classes of which 
new members become known from time to time (Russell 1948: 405). 
 
So, in this later work, Russell understands the principle of induction to be essen-
tially intensional as opposed to extensional. Moreover, therein he explicitly ad-
dresses Reichenbach’s solution from this perspective and argues that Reichen-
bach’s rule of induction is false. This argument is crucial in revealing what Rus-
sell believes is fundamental for the solution to the problem of induction pace 
Reichenbach. Russell’s argument begins by characterizing the posit that grounds 
Riechenbach’s approach to induction as follows: 
 
When a large number of a’s have been observed, and have all been found to be 
b’s, we should assume that very nearly all a’s are b’s. This assumption is neces-
sary (so he maintains) for the definition of probability, for all scientific prediction 
(Russell 1948: 413). 
 
But, Russell (1948: 413-14) argues that this principle can be shown to be false 
and that Reichenbach’s view entails a problematic infinite regress.  
To this end Russell introduces the following argument. Let is suppose that 
we have observed some number, a1, a2,…, an, of members of a class a that also 
have been discovered to be members of class b. Consider also that the next ob-
served a is an+1. If an+1 is a member of b we can substitute for b a new class hav-
ing all of the members of b except an+1. For this constructed class the Reichen-
bachean rule breaks down. Russell then says, 
 
This sort of argument is obviously capable of extension. It follows that if induc-
tion is to have any chance of validity, a and b must not be any classes, but clas-
ses having certain properties and relations (Russell 1948: 414). 
 
So, according to Russell, 
 
The problem of induction, on the contrary, demands intensional treatment. The 
classes a, b that occur in inductive inference are, if it is true, given in extension 
so far as the observed instances a1, a2,…, an are concerned, but beyond that point 
it is essential that, as yet, both the classes are known in intension (Russell 1948: 
414). 
 
But, it is on this basis he concludes explicitly that, “Reichenbach’s posit for in-
duction is therefore both too general and too extensional (Russell 1948: 415 [my 
emphasis]).” Russell’s contention about the regress arises in the following man-
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ner. If we do not adopt an intensionalist metaphysics, then all we have are ex-
tensionally given frequencies. But, such probabilities and the sequences on 
which they are based entail an infinite hierarchy of levels of higher-order proba-
bilities that cannot be stemmed rationally. His own view (Russell 1948: 471) is 
then that induction can be grounded and the regress stemmed by appeal to the 
following a priori principles concerning causality, natural laws and common 
structure: 
R1: When a number of similar structures of events exist in regions not wide-
ly separated, and are arranged about a center, there is an appreciable proba-
bility that they have been preceded by a central complex having the same 
structure, and they have occurred at times differing from a certain time by 
amounts proportional to their distance from this central structure. 
R2: Whenever a system of structurally similar events is found to be connect-
ed with a center in the sense that the time when each event occurs differs 
from a certain time by an amount proportional to the distance of the event 
from this center, there is an appreciable probability that all the events are 
connected with an event at the center by indeterminate links having spatio-
temporal contiguity with one another. 
R3: When a number of structurally similar systems, such as atoms of this or 
that element, are found to be distributed in what appears to be a random 
manner, without reference to a center, we infer that there are probably natu-
ral laws making such structures more stable than others that are logically 
possible, but are found to occur rarely or never. 
Whatever one might think about the specifics of these (rather obscure) princi-
ples, it should be clear that they are supposed to solve the problem of grounding 
induction by introducing intensions into the world via the idea of structures and 
natural laws connecting types of structures. More interestingly, Russell (1948: 
472) tells us that, “the above three principles, if accepted, will, I think, afford a 
sufficient a priori basis for most of the inferences that physics bases on observa-
tion”. So, in his later work we can see that Russell was still committed to the 
idea that a priori truths about intensions are what ground induction and that he 
explicitly rejected both extensional solutions and those based on pure forms of 
empiricism. 
 
6. Inductive Methods and Reliability 
Having examined Reichenbach’s purely extensional and empiricistic conception 
of scientific induction and Russell’s intensional and rationalistic conception of 
induction we can now turn out attention to the more general concept of an in-
ductive method and to the concept of the reliability of such methods in order to 
tease out some important lessons from the comparison of these views. Recall 
that Reichenbach’s justification of scientific induction essentially amounts to the 
claim that if any method at all works, then scientific induction will work, and so 
scientific induction is the best method available (i.e. it is optimal) even if it is 
just the best member of a bad lot. This is so because Reichenbach believes that 
we cannot establish whether or not the convergent relative limiting frequencies 
of observed sequences exist and so we cannot empirically establish that 1 ³ 
m(wa) > e. But, the ultimate reliability of the rule of induction depends, by defi-
nition, on the existence of such convergent limits and throughout his arguments 
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he presupposes extensional empiricism. Russell, on the other hand, introduces 
universals that we can come to know through the use of pure reason coupled 
with observation as the grounds for such order. Before proceeding with unpack-
ing what these views jointly imply, however, it will be instructive to examine the 
concepts of reliability and of a reliable inductive method from the conceptual 
point of view before confronting the real substance of the difference between 
Russell’s and Reichenbach’s approaches to the justification of induction.23  
The concept of an inductive method desired here is, trivially, a sub-species 
of the concept of a method, and, in this case, the sort of method in which we are 
interested is a procedural method or rule for making logical inferences from 
what we have observed to what we have not observed and from making infer-
ences from what we have observed to what is always the case. What we ideally 
wish to have in our possession is an algorithmic method of generating these de-
sired conclusions from the inputs which we have available to us based on obser-
vation. However, we know that by definition inductive methods are in some 
sense not perfectly truth-preserving, and, hence, that we must always accept the 
possibility that the conclusions of inductive inferences can be false when the 
premises are true. So, for induction to be reliable it does not need to be the case 
that m(wa) =1. This requires only that m(wa) > e. This is simply the recognition 
that inductive inference is a species of nonmonotonic inference, but, nonethe-
less, it does seem to be the case that we believe that, at least sometimes, it is ra-
tional to make such inferences. This is simply because induction allows that the 
conclusions of such inferences are probable on the assumption that we have true 
premises from which they follow. So, we are obliged to provide some appropri-
ate form of justification for such procedures even though they sometimes fail to 
produce true outputs. What we would like to know is how much credence we 
should give to such outputs, and this, intuitively, ought to reflect how reliable 
such methods, procedures, algorithms, rules, etc. are. It will also be instructive 
to examine what it is that makes such inferences unreliable or prone to error, 
and in doing so we will find that there are really two sense of the term ‘reliable’ 
involved.  
So, what do we mean by the phrase ‘reliable method’?24 Of course, borrow-
ing a turn of phrase from Peter Lipton,25 what we mean is that a method is 
‘truth-tropic’. That is to say, a method is a (perfectly) reliable method, at least in 
one sense, if and only if it will (at least at some point) produce the results it is 
supposed to produce. But, the reliability of such methods varies and it can, and 
should, be understood probabilistically. A reliable inductive method is one that 
tends to produce the correct results more often than it produces incorrect results 
in its domain of application; i.e. one that will likely allow us to arrive at the 
truth and avoid falsity with some likelihood that is greater than relying on 
chance and merely selecting an output at random from the set of all possible 
outputs concerning its domain of application. So, a minimally reliable method, 
by definition, is one that produces correct results with a degree of likelihood bet-
 
23 There are, of course, other sense of reliability that have been discussed in the literature 
on induction, algorithms and methods, but here we are concerned only with the very 
general sense of reliability that is closely tied to epistemological reliabilism. 
24 Kelly 1991 and Kelly 1996 introduce far technically more sophisticated notions of reli-
ability, but the simpler notion used here is sufficient for the purposes at hand. 
25 See Lipton 1991. 
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ter than chance and the sophisticated Reichenbach argument represents the reli-
ability of the inductive principle as the greater than chance probability that 1 ³ 
m(wa) > e. In fact, it should then be obvious that a procedure that performs at or 
below a mere chance level of success is really no method at all. As we have just 
seen, such a procedure is extensionally equivalent to having no rule at all and 
simply making a random selection. But, this sense of reliability, reliability1, ap-
plies only within the domain of application of the method in question. In other 
words, in this sense of reliability, a method is a reliable1 method, if and only if, it 
is likely that it will produce the correct results when applied to those things it is 
supposed (or designed) to be applied to.26  
In this sense we might consider using a metal detector to be a reliable1 way 
of detecting sufficiently large concentrations of metallic elements, but this sense of 
reliability does not imply, and should not be taken to imply, that there is anything 
in the domain of application of that method; i.e. that there are such metals. It is no 
criticism of a metal detector to say that it is unreliable1 in world in which there 
are no metallic elements. Such a detector might still very well be a reliable1 de-
tector of concentrations of metallic elements even if there were no such things in 
that particular world. The metal detector would still, more or less effectively, de-
tect large concentrations of metallic elements even if there happen not be any 
such things in the world where the detector exists.  
In any case, borrowing some insights from epistemological reliabilists and 
from the work both of Hume and Descartes, we must recognize that the general 
reliability of a belief forming mechanism or of an inference procedure is not 
purely a logical or conceptual matter concerning the procedure in question. Ra-
ther, the general reliability of such procedures is, at least in part, a function of 
the physical (and even metaphysical) features of the environment in which that 
procedure in employed. Hume’s essential insight was that in highly uniform en-
vironments we would be entitled to regard (straight-rule) induction as a general-
ly reliable procedure, but that we do not know and cannot non-circularly estab-
lish that we inhabit such an environment on the basis of merely observing par-
ticulars. So, we do not know what probabilities we should assign to the conclu-
sions of our inductive inferences in our world. Reichenbach recognized and 
sought to prove essentially that scientific induction is a reliable1 procedure, but 
what he saw as the real and more troubling problem with scientific induction 
was that it is not reliable in the sense that we do not, and apparently cannot, 
know that there exists anything in the domain of application of scientific induc-
tion (i.e. whether any convergent sequences exist). So, the general reliability of a 
method or procedure requires that it also be reliable2, and a method is reliable2, if 
and only if, it is reliable1 and there exist entities in the domain of application of 
that method. But, as Reichenbach saw it, in order to be non-pragmatically justi-
fied in believing that scientific induction is generally reliable we would need to 
show that such sequences exist in our world (or, at least that it is likely that such 
sequences exist in our world), and it does not seem to be the case that we can 
show that scientific induction is reliable2 if we are committed to purely exten-
sional empiricism. We simply do not have the ability to observe such limiting 
frequencies directly if extensional empiricism is true. In effect, given an exten-
sional empiricism we cannot project any regularities that hold among observed 
 
26 This point is similar to those made by Goldman (1986) concerning the relationship be-
tween reliability and one’s environment.  
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particulars to unobserved particulars because logically atomic statements that 
represent observations of particulars contain no information about any other 
such statement. But, we can vindicate induction in the pragmatic sense given 
such a metaphysical view and so we do not need to resort to the illicit a priori 
assumption of intensional logic to make it rational to apply the inductive rule. 
As Reichenbach tells Russell explicitly in a 1949 letter, “Induction does not re-
quire an intensional logic” (Reichenbach 1949d: 410). But, if we retain exten-
sional empiricism then the rationality of induction does require broadening our 
notion of what is rational to include pragmatic justifications. Pace Reichenbach 
it is then clear that Russell was prepared to cede the purely extensional empiri-
cism he adhered to early on in his work and to replace it with a more metaphys-
ically permissive view that countenanced non-reducible intensional entities (i.e. 
universals) as the metaphysical basis required to assure that induction would be 
reliable2. In doing so he was essentially endowing the world with a metaphysical 
structure robust enough to ensure such projectability. Moreover, he did so in 
such a way that the realibility2 of induction is an a priori matter because he 
treats the existence of the universals that ground the reliability2 of induction as 
an a priori truth of metaphysics. Russell essentially argues that this metaphysical 
truth guarantees that m(wa) > e. 
Consider, again, our case of the metal detector. We saw that such a proce-
dure is reliable1 if it is an effective procedure for detecting sufficiently large con-
centrations of metallic elements; if it will detect concentrations of metallic ele-
ments at a rate better than chance. But, such a method or procedure will be reli-
able2 if and only if, it is realiable1 and metallic elements of the sort the detector 
was designed to detect exist. So, the general reliability of the metal detector de-
pends on both of these senses of reliability being satisfied. In the case of scien-
tific induction we saw earlier that Reichenbach proved that scientific induction 
is a reliable1 method, but based on his staunchly held empiricist, extensionalist 
and verificationist leanings Reichenbach concluded, pace Russell, that we cannot 
know that scientific induction is reliable2, or even that it is probable that scien-
tific induction is reliable2. But, if we want to do science on a rational basis we 
have to countenance a pragmatic vindication of our practices of induction or we 
must simply give up on science altogether. He asserts this very point about the 
distinction between the reliability1 of induction versus its reliability2 and its im-
portance for science in terms of his own preferred analogy as follows: 
 
We are in the same situation as a man who wants to fish in an uncharted place of 
the sea. There is nobody to tell him whether or not there are fish in this place. 
Shall he cast his net? Well, if he wants to fish I would advise him to cast his net, 
at least to take the chance. It is preferable to try even in uncertainty than not to 
try and be certain of getting nothing (Reichenbach 1936: 157). 
 
To this he adds the following instructive claim: 
 
To restate the point in terms of the illustration above: the chances of our catching 
fish increase with the use of a more finely meshed net; we ought therefore to use such 
a net even if we do not know whether there are fish in the water or not (Reichenbach 
1936: 158 [my emphasis]). 
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However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that this conclusion follows only 
if we do not have empirical access to real intensional structures like those Rus-
sell introduced to ground induction. Of course, as we have already seen, in ex-
plicitly eschewing such metaphysical commitments Reichenbach explains that if 
we want to do science in the extensionalist and empiricist metaphysical framework we 
can only adopt and deploy the inductive rule on the basis of pragmatic consider-
ations. So, in virtue of these claims and those we canvassed earlier, Reichenbach 
is clear that we cannot know that convergent limiting frequencies exist if exten-
sional empiricism is true. But, if we don’t commit to using the inductive rule, 
then the very possibility of science is undermined. So, given what is epistemical-
ly at stake and if we commit to extensionalist empiricism, should use it on this 
pragmatic basis despite the epistemic limitations of our inductive practices.  
What shall we make of all of this? On the one hand (and pace BonJour and 
others who have leveled the charge of obscurity at Reichenbach’s solution), 
there is then nothing really obscure about Reichenbach’s view at all. He was 
merely claiming that the pragmatic vindication of induction was the only option 
open to those who subscribe to extensional empiricism and the price he was 
forced to pay for subscribing to this conservative epistemic and metaphysical 
framework was that of simply having to accept the conclusion of BonJour’s not 
entirely hypothetical inductive skeptic. But, again, there is no obscurity in this at 
all and vindication offers a way to adroitly avoid such skepticism, even if only by 
expansion of the relevant conception of rationality. On the other hand, in order 
to ground induction in such way as to answer the inductive skeptic, Russell was 
prepared to pay the price of ceding his basic commitment to a simple Humean 
extensional empiricism and to accept a metaphysically dubious and inflationary 
form of essentialism on an a priori basis.  
Reichenbach, of course, did not see Russell’s rejection of extensional empir-
icism as necessary at all and this is the gist of his point in the 1949 letter to Rus-
sell. As we saw, Russell (1948) had contended that Reichenbach’s view entailed 
a problematic infinite regress of levels of probabilities and that, as a result, 
grounding induction required adopting an intensional metaphysics. But, near 
the very beginning of that letter Reichenbach claims that Russell misunderstands 
his view and that in even a reasonably brief meeting, “You would then see that 
your abandonment of empiricism is unnecessary and that you need not resort to 
an “extra-logical principle not based on experience” (Reichenbach 1949d: 405). 
Reichenbach dedicates the remainder of the letter to clarifying his view, answer-
ing Russell’s worries about the regress of probability levels and ultimately adopt-
ing the view that “there are other reasons to make assertions than reasons based 
on belief” (Russell 1949d: 407). Specifically, the assertion of the existence of the 
limits of relative frequencies that grounds the inductive rule is a pragmatically 
grounded posit that stems the alleged regress. On this basis Reichenbach dodges 
Russell’s worries by adopting a more inclusive methodology and retaining an 
extensionalist and empiricist metaphysics. So, as suggested in the introductory 
remarks to this paper, paying careful attention to the metaphysical views in-
volved in both Russell’s and Reichenbach’s views and manifest in their brief ex-
change makes clear what was (and still is) at stake in this matter. 
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 7. Induction Redux: Extensionalism, Intensionalism and Hy-
per-intensionalism 
So, what does this brief but important historical exchange tell us about the con-
temporary situation with respect to the problem of justifying induction? The 
point made here is that this methodological and epistemological debate about 
induction between Russell and Reichenbach shows us, among other things, that 
we cannot easily disentangled methodological matters from the associated met-
aphysical issues. In the narrow context of this particular debate what we can 
learn from the Russell/Reichenbach exchange is that the sort of justification that 
can be given for induction depends deeply on austerity of one’s metaphysics and 
that richer metaphysical resources yield richer methodological resources. Specif-
ically, the commitment to purely extensional metaphysics precludes the success-
ful epistemic justification of induction and suggests the more radical move that 
induction only admits of pragmatic justification, but helping one’s self to more 
inflationary metaphysical views opens up the door to epistemological justifica-
tions of induction. However, given the centrality of induction in human reason-
ing and the increasingly wide-spread recognition that offering a substantial, suc-
cessful and non-pragmatic justification of induction requires conceding both 
purely extensional and merely intensional metaphysics in favor of yet more in-
flationary hyper-intensional metaphysics, it is at least provisionally clear that 
there is something to be said for inflationary metaphysics as it applies here and 
in the broader discipline of philosophy.27 In effect, all of this suggests that the 
severe methodological and epistemological costs associated with the most aus-
tere extensionalist metaphysical views may be simply too costly when it comes 
to the matter of induction and the same sort of lesson may apply to a variety of 
philosophical issues involving the inter-play of methodology and metaphysics.28 
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